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Ascribing motivation to bureaucratic behavior has been a long- 
standing problem i n  public policy scholarship. Most examinations of 
bureaucratic motivation explore two competing theories. Some contend 
that government managers are primarily motivated by the quest for 
more resources, widely known as aggrandizement. Others assert that 
government  managers are preoccupied w i t h  organizational 
maintenance and the desire for autonomy. Scholars look for evidence 
of agency competition in situations where functional rivalry exists as 
a means of examining these theories. Recently, Kunioka and 
Rothenberg (1 993) concluded that government managers in the U.S. 
Forest Service and the National Park Service were more concerned 
with agency autonomy than with aggrandizement because they did  
not show competitive inclinations. This article seeks to demonstrate 
that government managers i n  autonomous agencies reveal competitive 
behaviors when core tasks are threatened. It also presents an  analytical 
framework based on three overt behaviors that can be used to examine 
autonomy in action. The analytical framework is applied to the 
Denver Water Board's behavior i n  the context of Colorado water 
politics. 
Most scholars interested in public administration recognize 
the integral role government managers play in the policy process. 
Government managers use their knowledge and skills to 
contribute to the content of public policy, to write rules and 
regulations, and to deliver public goods and services. Thus, 
given this level of participation in governing, scholars have 
searched for a theory of motivation that can be used to help 
explain administrative behavior. One reason that the motivation 
question has yet to be answered is that government managers, 
like all people, have many motivations-from the civic-minded 
manager's desire to improve service delivery to the greedy 
abuser of government perks. 
Two theories of motivation have emerged to compete for the 
attention of scholars. The aggrandizement theorists assert that 
government managers are motivated by the quest for more 
money, more people, and more responsibilities. Most of ten 
these gains are made at the expense of functional rivals in the 
competition for limited government resources (Downs, 1967; 
Niskanen, 1971; Rourke, 1984; Tullock, 1965; Twight, 1983). TO 
test this theory Clarke and McCool(1985) examined the behavior 
of functional rivals among federal natural resource management 
agencies. Clarke and McCooI found that the agencies most 
adept at expanding their responsibilities under the National 
Environmental Policy Act also gained more resources, which 
supported the aggrandizement theory. The Army Corps of 
Engineers and the U.S. Forest Service, the most ardent 
competitors, earned bigger budgets and hired more personnel 
than their functional rivals (Clarke and McCool, 1985). 
Other scholars have challenged the aggrandizement 
theorists, arguing that government managers are more interested 
in maintaining agency autonomy than expanding their reach 
and resources (Kunioka and Rothenberg, 1993; Mumme and 
Moore, 1990; Wilson, 1989, 1978). These scholars, borrowing 
from Wilson, define autonomy as "relatively" undisputed 
jurisdiction over specific policy arenas (Wilson, 1989, pp. 181, 
183n; 1978). Under this theory, government managers avoid 
new responsibilities because they rarely come with expanded 
resources. Instead, new responsibilities often carry the burdens 
of new clients, more oversight, and new opportunities for 
failure. New responsibilities may also be in conflict with the 
basic operational objectives of the agency, or its "core tasks" 
(Wilson, 1989, pp. 221-226). Core tasks are a useful measure of 
autonomy because they are difficult to change and often "provide 
the basis for a strong and widely shared sense of mission" 
(Wilson, 1989, p. 195; 1978, p. 12). 
EXAMINING AGENCY COMPETITION 
Kunioka and Ro thenberg (1993) compared the 
aggrandizement and autonomy theories using case studies in 
which the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest Service 
were in competition. Contrary to Clarke and McCool (19851, 
they found that managers in these organizations were not eager 
to take on new responsibilities, to criticize functional rivals for 
poor performance, or even to pat themselves on the back by 
publicizing their agency's achievements. Instead, these 
managers worked to avoid new responsibilities that they deemed 
too political, controversial, or contrary to their missions. Thus, 
Kunioka and Rothenberg concluded that "concerns over 
autonomy consistently predominate" the decisions government 
managers make (1993, p. 721). 
The contrary findings of these two studies reveal some 
interesting problems with the autonomy and aggrandizement 
theories that will be addressed in this article. First, Kunioka 
and Rothenberg base their conclusion on a lack of supporting 
evidence for competitive behavior between the Forest Service 
and the Park Service (1993, p. 721). However, this conclusion 
defies a great deal of empirical evidence indicating that even 
autonomous agencies exhibit competitive behavior (Downs, 
1967; Niskanen, 1971). The A m y  Corps of Engineers is an 
autonomous agency in that it has well-defined core tasks, a 
supportive constituency base, and enjoys relative freedom from 
executive interference. However, the Corps has found itself 
entangled with the Bureau of Reclamation in the western states 
(Maass, 1951; Mazmanian and Nienaber, 1979). Wilson contends 
most government managers would like to have the freedom to 
pursue their agency's core tasks with a minimum of external 
constraints, but this is rarely the case (1989, p. 181). Instead, 
government managers must compete to maintain their control 
over specific policy arenas. 
Second, both of these studies fail to consider the possibility 
of vertical or horizontal competition from functional rivals in 
other governments. Vertically, federal, state, and local agencies 
sometimes compete with each other for control over 
responsibilities and resources. In Denver, Colorado, the Denver 
Water Board has successfully thwarted the Bureau of 
Reclamation's attempts to build raw water facilities for that city 
(Ellison, 1993). In another example, Crotty (1987) described 
how state environmental protection agencies are often at odds 
with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency over federal 
mandates and the conditions of primacy. Horizontally, 
functional rivalry is evident between similar agencies in different 
governments at the same level. State economic development 
agencies compete for business (Grady, 1987); local water agencies 
compete for new service opportunities (Kahrl, 1982; Wiley and 
Gottlieb, 1982); while regional airport authorities compete for 
travelers (Axelrod, 1992). 
REEXAMINING AGENCY COMPETITION 
This study seeks to show that autonomous agencies exhibit 
competitive behavior when their core tasks are threatened with 
its analysis of the Denver Water Board's behavior in the context 
of Colorado water politics. The Denver Water Board is an ideal 
candidate for this analysis because it has competed with 
functional rivals, both vertically and horizontally, to maintain 
its autonomy. Vertically, the Denver Water Board has competed 
with the Bureau of Reclamation for limited water development 
opportunities in Colorado. Horizontally, the water 
commissioners have found themselves in competition withother 
municipal water utilities for new service opportunities. 
Additionally, the Denver Water Board possesses three 
characteristics of a successfully autonomous agency: objective 
and well-defined goals, sufficient and available technology, 
and the freedom to "apply a suitable technology to a given 
objective" (Wilson, 1978, p. 203). The Denver Water Board's 
core task is clearly defined in the city charter.' Next, water 
lawyers and engineers who are experts at water appropriation 
and delivery dominate the Denver Water Board, ensuring the 
agency's technological capabilities. Finally, the politically 
isolated Denver Water Board has consistently demonstrated 
that it possesses the freedom to pursue water development 
initiatives even when faced with stiff resistance. 
This analysis assumes that government managers work to 
maintain autonomy and that sometimes their behavior is 
competitive. By focusing on how the agency has worked to 
perform and protect its core tasks over time, I intend to overcome 
the weaknesses of the Kunioka and Rothenberg (1993) and 
Clarke and McCool (1985) studies discussed earlier. First, 
competitive behavior is not inconsistent with the autonomy 
model. Thus, managers at the Denver Water Board should 
reveal competitive inclinations when the agency's core tasks 
are threatened. Second, this analysis will examine threats to the 
Denver Water Board's core tasks from functional rivals in other 
governments. 
Additionally, rather than looking for behaviors that should 
be evident if competition existed, Wilson (1989) and Mumme 
and Moore (1990) provide a framework for examining autonomy 
in action that focuses on three observable behaviors relative to 
the core task idea, namely: 
Avoiding control by elected officials, which implies any action 
government managers take to thwart external attempts to 
alter the agency's ability to perform its core tasks 
Avoiding unwanted functions, which implies an  
unwillingness by government mangers to accept new tasks 
that may detract or hinder the agency's ability to perform 
its core tasks 
Resisting predation by other agencies, which implies an 
unwillingness by government managers to share or give- 
up programmatic responsibilities to other governments 
(Ellison, 1995) 
To assess the Denver Water Board's behavior over time, 
case studies were selected in which outside entities presented 
some threat to the agency's ability to perform its core tasks. As 
other scholars have noted, analyses of this type often involve 
discovering the idiosyncrasies of agency behavior--or those 
elements that differentiate one organization fromanother (Clarke 
and McCool, 1985; Rourke, 1984). Case analysis is required to 
ascertain the variables that may be used to explain agency 
behavior in subsequent quantitative studies. 
The following section presents a brief description of the 
sources of competition in Denver metropolitan water politics. 
Next, the agency's ability to maintain its autonomy will be 
examined in terms of the three behaviors described above. 
Documentary information, archival data, and information 
gleaned from interviews were collected on the Denver Water 
Board between April 1992 and January 1993. Documentary and 
archival data were collected at the Denver Public Library 
Western History Collection, the Denver Water Board Archives, 
regional newspapers, magazines, university libraries, and 
government documents collections. Interviews were conducted 
with a variety of actors in Denver water politics to gain a 
broader understanding of Denver Water Board behavior and to 
check data gathered. Selection of interviewees was partially 
based on the results of an elite survey conducted in 1990, in 
which the participants, selected by reputation, were asked to 
name the most influential individuals and groups in Denver 
water politics. Sixty-four original interviews were conducted 
with past and present Denver Water Board commissioners and 
employees (29); with local, state, and federal government 
employees and elected officials (18); and with representatives 
from environmental interest groups, pro-growth organizations, 
and the private sector (17). Thirteen follow-up interviews were 
conducted with various members of each of the three groups.' 
THE DENVER WATER BOARD: 
SOURCES OF COMPETITION 
Economic development and  growth in the  Denver 
metropolitan area depend on the availability of water. Denver's 
location in the South Platte Valley, at the base of the Rocky 
Mountains, is not the ideal location for a large city. The 
mountains block most of the moisture from the west and the 
region's groundwater is nonrenewable. It was inevitable that 
the streams feeding the tiny settlements of Denver City and 
Auraria during the 1850s and 1860s, the South Platte River and 
Cherry Creek, would become quickly inadequate as  Denver 
grew into a large city by the turn of the century (Dorsett, 1977; 
Miller, 1971; Milliken, 1988). 
To gain control over the city's growth and development, 
Denver's citizens purchased the Denver Union Water Company 
and created the Denver Board of Water Commissioners in 1918. 
Since Denverf s progressive leaders wanted the water department 
to be "managed by a non-political board of businessmen," the 
new water department was organized along the commission 
model (Pickering, 1978, p. 95). Members of the board were 
appointed by the mayor, served six-year overlapping terms, 
and could not be removed from office. Additionally, the water 
commissioners were given complete control over the water 
department's revenues, which were placed in a water fund and 
kept strictly separated from the city's general fund. By 
separating the board from the political influences of elections 
and the annual budget process, the progressives hoped that the 
commissioners would be free to apply business principles to 
managing the water utility. While the water commissioners 
need voter approval before projects can be financed with 
municipal bonds-their one source of accountability-public 
appeals for funds rarely have been denied. In the face of board 
reports predicting higher costs, more conservation, and limited 
growth, most citizens eagerly approved new projects (Johnson, 
1969; Kahrl, 1982; Miller, 1971). 
The Denver Water Board's core task-to assure an adequate 
supply of high quality water for all uses and purposes to Denver 
and its surrounding inhabitants and to lease water not needed by 
Denver to the surrounding metropolitan area-made sense when 
it was created in 1918 through referendum to the city charter. 
Denver was the largest city in the area and it alone had the service 
base needed to support a large water utility. Moreover, most 
people in Denver and the outlying communities expected the city 
to annex smaller communities as its boundaries expanded. When 
the citizens of Colorado created the city and county of Denver by 
approving Article XX to the Colorado Constitution, it not only 
passed by a large margin but it also included provisions that 
made for easy annexation to the city (Cox, 1967; Johnson, 1969; 
Miller, 1971; Milliken, 1988; Mosley , 1966). 
SOURCES OF COMPETITION 
The Denver Water Board competes with two sets of 
functional rivals to perform its core task. As a water resources 
development agency-building large diversion, storage, and 
treatment facilities-the board competed with water developers 
on both sides of the Rocky Mountains for limited project 
construction opportunities. The Bureau of Reclamation, for 
example, has sponsored several massive irrigation projects on 
both sides of the mountains. One bureau client, the Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy District, currently operates the 
largest transbasin diversion project in the world (Tyler, 1992). 
Additionally, several cities, including Englewood, Thornton, 
and Colorado Springs, have developed their own water projects. 
While this activity does not directly affect the board's ability to 
develop its water rights, which are protected by the Colorado 
Constitution, it does exacerbate state-wide tensions that make 
development more difficult. 
Next, as a water utility-delivering clean water to the citizens 
of Denver and leasing water to area inhabitants-the Denver 
Water Board competes with other municipal water departments 
in the metropolitan area. During its early years, the board 
dominated competition for new service areas because it had 
most of the water. But in the 1950s, the board imposed several 
service restrictions on the suburbs that forced many of them to 
develop independent water supplies. By the 1970s, these water 
departments were positioned to offer service to new areas. 
Suddenly, suburban politicians saw new revenue opportunities 
in the unincorporated developments that were springing up 
around Denver. Recognizing Denver's past annexation 
successes, suburban politicians promoted plans that would 
allow their general purpose governments to extend services to 
new areas, annex them, and collect their sales and property 
taxes (Ellison, 1993). 
Standing between regional and suburban plans for water 
resources development are several institutional arrangements 
that make the Denver Water Board a formidable obstacle. For 
example, the doctrine of prior appropriation, the fundamental 
tenet of Colorado water law, gives the Denver Water Board an 
advantage in the competition because its first members-the 
board itself, along with the banking, construction, and business 
communities that had the most to gain from Denver's growth- 
had the foresight to secure the western slope water rights 
needed to service what some hoped would become a 600- 
square-mile supercity (Miller, 1971; Milliken, 1988). 
Additionally, because Denver's progressive leaders feared the 
chicanery of state politicians, Denver's home rule amendment 
included provisions that protected its right to operate a 
municipal utility (Colorado Constitution, art. XX, sect 6). Article 
V, section 35 of the Colorado Constitution states that the "General 
assembly shall not delegate to any special commission ... any 
power to make, supervise, or interfere with any municipal 
improvement, money, property, or effects ... or perform a 
municipal function whatever." Article XXV established the 
Colorado Public Utilities Commission (PUC), whose members 
are appointed by the General Assembly, and empowered it to 
regulate utilities "provided, however, nothing herein shall affect 
the power of municipalities to exercise reasonable police and 
licensing powers, nor their power to grant franchises; and 
provided, further, that nothing herein shall be construed to 
apply to municipally owned utilities.', 
What makes these institutional arrangements especially 
troublesome for the Denver Water Board's competitors--other 
water developers and municipal utilities-is that they are also 
protected by these provisions in the Colorado Constitution. 
Elected officials and government managers in other suburban 
cities also want to develop their water rights and water utilities 
but do not want the state's Public Utilities Commission to regulate 
their activities. Thus, any changes in these arrangements that 
would hinder the Denver Water Board would also affect them. 
Other Sources of Competition 
To fully appreciate the competitive environment in the 
Denver metropolitan area for water resources development and 
distribution opportunities, it is important to briefly review the 
Denver Water Board's relationship with the governments that 
lease its water. These entities-mostly special district govern- 
ments and the region's independent water developers and 
municipal utilities-play a special role in the intergovernmental 
mix of threats to the Denver Water Board's autonomy. 
Many of the people who moved into the booming Denver 
metropolitan area during the 1950s and 1960s decided to live 
outside the city. In 1940, 28 percent of the metropolitan 
population lived outside Denver. By 1960, that number climbed 
to 49 percent of the total metro population; by 1986, it was 75 
percent. Meanwhile, Denver's population had stabilized at 
approximately 500,000 people by 1960 (Denver Regional Council 
of Governments, 1986; Milliken, 1988). 
Because these people were moving into unincorporated 
developments outside Denver, they were without public services 
and understandably turned to the water commissioners for 
water service. In response to this demand, the board 
implemented several policies designed to protect water quality 
and the structural integrity of their water system. First, the 
board only signed distribution contracts with special district or 
municipal governments, reasoning that these governments 
would have the taxing authority to maintain their systems. 
Second, the board enforced operational compliance through its 
Engineering Standards manual, and its rules and regulations for 
water distribution. Taken together, these actions helped assure 
the engineers that these systems would be in compliance with 
board's rigorous technical standards when they were acquired 
through annexation sometime in the future (Board of Water 
Commissioners, 1981 ). 
Two things happened, however, that created a series of 
unusual institutional arrangements in Denver water politics. 
First, the Denver Water Board's operational policies created a 
proliferation of special district governments in the Denver 
metropolitan area, specifically created to distribute its water. 
Second, suburban citizens did not want to become part of 
Denver and,  in 1974, succesfully amended the state's 
constitution, taking away the city's annexation powers (Milliken, 
1988). Suddenly, many suburban general purpose governments 
found themselves freed from the threat of annexation, but in 
their midst were dozens of special district governments with 
institutional ties to the Denver Water Board. Instead of the city 
officials from Littleton, Colorado governing the municipality's 
most precious resource, water service was still controlled by 
the Platte Canyon Water & Sanitation District and the Denver 
Water Board. Thus, even though the relationship between the 
city of Denver and the suburbs had been radically altered, the 
fundamental institutional relationships that controlled growth 
and land-use planning were still in place (Ellison, 1993). 
These tensions have been further exacerbated by the Denver 
Water Board's policies regarding service priorities and its 
aggressive pursuit of its water development and distribution 
missions. The board's charter directs its commissioners to 
provide water to Denver's residents at rates "as low as good 
service will permit" (ch. C ,  art. IV, sec. C4.22) and to service 
them first during times of drought (ch. C, art. IV, sec. C4.26). In 
practice, the water commissioners subsidized the cost of service 
to Denver's residents with higher suburban rates and included 
provisions in their delivery contracts that forced the suburbs to 
bear the brunt of any water shortages. Over the past 30 years, 
this situation forced suburban politicians to denounce the Denver 
Water Board and to call for independent water supplies. 
Nevertheless, the water commissioners sought every 
opportunity to expand their agency's capacity to provide water 
service to the suburbs. During the 1970s, the water 
commissioners fought to construct the massive Foothills Water 
Treatment Plant; in the 1980s, they sought the permits needed 
to build the Two Forks Dam and Reservoir. These actions 
forced the board's competitors to cry foul. Denver already had 
ample water supplies and further extensions of water service to 
the suburbs threatened regional economic development plans. 
Suburban leaders realized, like Denver's early progressives, that 
water was the key to controlling and benefiting from growth. 
AVOIDING CONTROL BY ELECTED OFFICIALS 
Since the 1950s' politicians from general purpose 
governments in the Denver metropolitan area and the western 
slope have launched several efforts to place the Denver Water 
Board under the control of elected officials. Some politicians 
called for the Colorado Public Utilities Commission to regulate 
the board's activities, for regional representation on the Denver 
Water Board, or for the formation of a metropolitan service 
authority capable of developing and controlling water resources. 
Almost without exception, the water commissioners used their 
expertise in the legal, technical, and financial issues related to 
water resources development and delivery to respond to these 
threats. 
Earnest threats to politicize the Denver Water Board's assets 
began in the courts in the 1950s. The city of Englewood argued 
in state court that the board's control over regional water 
resources-specifically its power to set rates and direct water 
use in Englewood-made it a regional utility and therefore 
subject to state regulation under the Colorado Public Utilities 
Commission. Unfortunately for Englewood, both the Colorado 
district and supreme courts agreed with the board's argument 
that Denver's residents had "mortgaged their homes and 
businesses to pay for the present system" and that state 
regulation would take a substantial portion of their investment 
away ("Chase Looks," 1950; City of Englewood v. City and County 
of Denver, 1951; "Denver-Englewood," 1950; Gustin, 1950). 
At the same time, a coalition of western slope governments 
sued the water commissioners in federal district court, 
contending that construction of a massive transbasin diversion 
project, the Blue River-Roberts Tunnel Diversion, would inhibit 
their ability to grow and that "since the water falls naturally on 
the western slope, it should remain there" (Buchanan, 1950, p. 
3). This lawsuit was resolved in 1955 when then-President 
Dwight D. Eisenhower mediated a settlement, called the Blue 
River Agreement, between the board and the western slope. In 
exchange for a halt to the litigation, the Denver Water Board 
agreed not to sell its surplus water to farmers, to reimburse the 
Bureau of Reclamation for hydropower losses created by the 
diversion, and to slow the pace of their transbasin diversion 
projects (Gavin, 1955; "Ike Given Credit," 1955; "Proposal 
Brightens Hopes," 1955; Stoleberg, 1955). 
While each of these items would seem to limit the board's 
autonomy, they actually enhanced it. The agreement not to provide 
water to farmers was most important to the western slope coalition 
because its members did not want to see the Denver Water Board 
in the business of transporting agricultural water over the 
mountains. For their part, the board did not want to provide water 
to farmers either because it would tie the city's water supply to the 
state's powerful agriculture industry (Ellison, 1993). 
Still, contrary to the expressed intent of the agreement, the 
board used the other two items to justify construction of additional 
transbasin diversion facilities. In 1956, the water commissioners 
announced plans to expand the Williams Fork Collection System 
in order to generate electricity ("Blue-South Platte," 1956). 
Needless to say, stunned politicians from the western slope 
governments immediately announced plans to sue the board 
(Stoleberg, 1955). But within a month the Bureau of Reclamation 
forced the western slope governments to back down. The bureau 
supported the expansion since it would provide the power needed 
to meet the stipulations of the Blue River Agreement. For their 
part, the western slope governments were hesitant to cross the 
Bureau of Reclamation because they were not willing to jeopardize 
their own Ute Park Reclamation Project (Brenneman, 1956). 
Thus, the Denver Water Board used its legal expertise to change 
the definition of the problem from too much water going over the 
mountain to a shortage of generated electricity; in so doing, the 
board made an ally of the bureau while depriving elected officials 
from western slope governments of any influence over the its 
water development policies. 
In addition to legal expertise, the board depended on its 
technical experts to help them oppose threats to its political 
autonomy. In most cases, technical expertise has been used to 
help keep the public's attention focused on the agency's core 
tasks. In the 1920s, when a funding referendum was rejected by 
Denver's residents, the board commissioned an independent 
engineering firm to conduct a study of the city's water resources. 
When the report confirmed the board's warnings that drought 
was inevitable, Denver's citizens quickly approved the water 
commissioners' second funding referendum (Cox, 1967; Mosley, 
1957). Thus, from the agency's inception, the commissioners 
knew that expertise could be used to enhance public support, 
and they have used it most effectively when elected officials 
threatened their autonomy. 
During the debate surrounding the board's intention to 
construct the Foothills Water Treatment Plant in the 1970s, a 
variety of elected officials discussed the water commissioners' 
role in urban sprawl, annexation, and the need for them to join 
various intergovernmental cooperation initiatives. But the board 
consistently pointed to their decreasing capacity to provide 
treated water to the suburbs. By the late 1970s, as the board's 
commissioners began to back up their predictions with constraints 
such as lawn and garden watering restrictions, the Foothills 
controversy was quickly resolved in their favor (Ellison, 1993). 
The Denver Water Board also used its fiscal expertise to 
protect itself from challenges to its political autonomy. In 
February of 1986, Denver's Mayor Frederico Pelia formed the 
Metropolitan Cooperation Group and offered to trade control 
over Denver's water supply for suburban assistance on a "wide 
variety of issues" such as "transportation, the airport, health 
care for the indigent, cultural facilities, growth and land use 
planning, and other topics" (Davis, 1989, p. 18). Ultimately, the 
Metropolitan Cooperation Group did provide a forum that 
contributed to cooperation on the creation of a cultural facilities 
district, implementation of a regional air quality program, and 
construction of the Denver International Airport. But the group 
failed to develop an intergovernmental entity, such as a regional 
water authority, that could provide the basis for a new form of 
metropolitan governance. 
One reason the Metropolitan Cooperation Group failed to 
achieve its objective was that the water commissioners insisted 
Denver recoup its water investment before they would go along 
with the formation of a regional water authority. This strategy 
served the Denver Water Board well because it focused Denver's 
attention on its most valuable asset and split regional solidarity 
on the water issue. Thus, while local elected officials could agree 
that a regional water authority should be created, they could not 
agree on the details that the board's fiscal demands created: Who 
should pay for the system and who should run it? Metropolitan 
governments contended that Colorado should pay for the system 
to eliminate regional service fragmentation. But these same local 
governments, both counties and municipalities, could not agree 
on the membership of any proposed service authority. County 
officials did not want city officials running the service authority 
because they would have been overly concerned with urban 
issues, while municipal officials feared that the counties would 
allow over-representation by suburban interests (Ellison, 1993). 
The examples presented here reflect actions the Denver Water 
Board has taken to avoid control by elected officials. While other 
examples abound, my purpose here is to show that government 
managers must often work in a competitive environment to 
protect their agency's ability to perform its core tasks. Under the 
Colorado Public Utilities Commission's regulation, the board's 
ability to provide high quality water to Denver's citizens first, 
before considering the needs of the suburbs, would be curtailed. 
Without a willingness to protect the citizensf investment in their 
water department, local politicians might trade their assets away. 
AVOIDING UNWANTED FUNCTIONS 
Government managers will avoid new functions that may 
detract or hinder their agency's ability to perform its core tasks. 
For the Denver Water Board, the requirements to perform new 
functions have mostly come with its efforts to comply with 
federal environmental regulations during permit application 
processes. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, the water commissioners could 
ignore federal water programming pressures simply by turning 
their backs on the federal government's money. The board had 
its own resources; during the 1960s, it doubled its raw water 
capacity by completing a massive transbasin diversion project 
that the federal government had offered to build. But its success 
at developing raw water facilities during the 1960s created new 
problems during the 1970s. Constructing raw water facilities 
solves only half the problem since water must be treated before 
it can be delivered to customers. Thus, in 1973, facing extreme 
shortages in its treated water supply, the board proposed 
construction of the Foothills complex, which would include a 
water treatment plant and the Strontia Springs Dam and 
Reservoir (Milliken, 1988). 
Since the board had plenty of treated water to meet Denver's 
needs, it justified construction of the Foothills complex based 
on suburban need. However, by promoting the Foothills complex 
as a suburban project, the board made a costly error that stalled 
its initiative and empowered its rivals. Denver's residents did 
not understand why they should finance suburban water projects 
and refused to pass the board's first bond initiative. Suburban 
politicians used their position in the debate to encourage a 
broader discussion about annexation, economic development, 
and environmental problems (Milliken, 1988). 
Moreover, the board was unprepared for changes in its 
policymaking environment that resulted from passage of federal 
environmental legislation during the early 1970s. Suddenly, 
long-ignored environmental interest groups could participate 
in the board's decision-making processes. Federal agencies 
also played new roles. The Bureau of Land Management, in 
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (PL 91- 
190), was selected to assess the project's environmental impacts 
and even to make recommendations about alternatives; the 
Denver Water Board was required to apply to the Army Corps 
of Engineers for the permits needed to build the reservoir 
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, PL 
92-500; Gordon, 1978a, 1978b; U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Land Management, 1977). 
The Denver Water Board responded to these new threats 
through its usual tactics, imposing service restrictions that 
quickly encouraged Denver's residents to pass the Board's 
second bond initiative. But the suburbs and the federal 
government refused to budge on their demands. Suburban 
politicians wanted to alter Denver's annexation powers through - 
the formation of a intergovernmental boundary control 
commission. Federal officials, such as the Environmental 
Protection Agency's regional administrator, hoped to link the 
development of water projects in Denver to suburban sprawl, 
air pollution, lack of public transportation, and even regional 
institutional structures for land use planning (Gordon, 1978b). 
In February 1979, Congressman Timothy Wirth (D-Colorado) 
mediated a settlement to the dispute. In exchange for the 
permits needed to build the Foothills complex, the board agreed 
to implement a water conservation program; to improve wildlife 
habitat downstream from Strontia springs ~eservoir;  to increase 
public participation in the board's policymaking activities; and 
to pay legal expenses for the environmental interest groups 
(Foothills Consent Decree, 1979). 
To the Denver Water Board, two of these items were 
unwanted functions that could not be easily reconciled with its 
core tasks. The water commissioners were not charged with 
developing public participation programs or with regulating 
the behavior of their customers. Instead, the water 
commissioners viewed their core tasks in the starkest engineering 
and business terms. Storing, treating, and delivering water to 
the citizens of Denver and leasing unneeded water to the suburbs 
was not a social problem that required public participation, but 
a technical problem that was dependent on the services of 
engineers and lawyers. Thus, the water commissioners devised 
responses to each of these new tasks that kept them strictly 
separated from the agency's ability to perform its core tasks. 
In response to the settlement's public participation 
requirements, the Denver Water Board created a Citizens 
Advisory Council (CAC) composed of citizen volunteers from 
Denver, the suburbs, and the western slope. But since the 
council was not given a formal role in the board's decision- 
making processes, the water commissioners quickly brushed it 
aside. During the Two Forks debate of the 1980s, the advisory 
council did not even take a position on the proposed 1.1 million 
acre-foot reservoir. As a past CAC president noted, the advisory 
council simply "went invisible" during the Two Forks debate 
because of internal bickering and a real sense that their efforts 
were going unnoticed (Ellison, 1993). Thus, the board did 
create a forum for public participation to comply with the terms 
of the Foothills settlement, but it did not give the resulting 
council a genuine role in its decision-making processes. 
The conservation programs the Denver Water Board 
developed in response to the Foothills settlement were also 
designed to protect the agency's ability to perform its core 
tasks. To the water commissioners, conservation programs 
were public relations tools that could be used to encourage the 
wise use of water. Indeed, the board had always operated some 
conservation programs. In 1938, the board restricted lawn and 
garden watering and wrote in its first operating rule that "water 
shall never be wasted" (Board of Water Commissioners, 1989). 
In 1957, the agency imposed a metering program on its suburban 
customers and on new homes in Denver, and by 1979 had 
already started several education programs designed to raise 
public awareness about water use (Board of Water 
Commissioners, 1989, 1974). 
The fundamental issue to the environmentalists, however, 
was not whether the water board had implemented conservation 
programs, but whether the resulting water savings were 
incorporated into the agency's hydrological models. As one 
scholar noted about the Denver Water Board, engineers have 
lingering "questions about the reliability of conservation as a 
water management tool and the degree to which conservation 
should substitute for development of additional supplies during 
nondrought periods" (Milliken, 1988, p. 362). Thus, while the 
environmentalists wanted to implement conservation programs 
to reduce the need to construct new water plant facilities, the 
engineers did not even include conservation savings in their 
hydrological models. 
Nevertheless, the water commissioners acknowledged that 
water savings from conservation programs could be used as a 
supply component in their models and agreed to work with the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of 
Engineers to establish and monitor conservation goals. The 
board even agreed not to pursue any water development 
initiatives until these goals were achieved. But in 1986, far from 
meeting the objectives of the water savings program, the board 
announced its intention to build the Two Forks Dam and 
Reservoir. Revealing the internal dynamics of the water 
department, the board even justified the need for Two Forks 
with hydrological models that projected no decrease in per 
capita water use by the year 2010 (Ellison, 1993). 
Needless to say, the stakeholders in the Foothills settlement 
were outraged by the board's newest construction proposals, 
but the water commissioners had two responses. First, they 
argued that the Foothills settlement simply required a good 
faith effort toward the goals (Hill, 1989). Second, they questioned 
the legality of the agreement since a U.S. District judge had 
refused to sign the final consent decree due to jurisdictional 
concerns (Obmascik, 1989; Foothills Consent Decree, 1979). Thus, 
in the end, the board revealed that it was not willing to surrender 
one core aspect of its autonomy-its ability to determine its own 
performance measures-to public demands for effective 
conservation programs. 
The Denver Water Board quickly implemented the final two 
points of the Foothills settlement since they did not affect its 
core tasks. The provision requiring the improvement of 
downstream habitats was satisfied when the board agreed to 
help the Army Corps of Engineers maintain minimal water 
levels in the two streams that flow through Denver, the South 
Platte River and Cherry Creek (Board of Water Commissioners, 
1991). The board paid environmentalists' legal expenses, which 
amounted to $47,500 (Foothills Consent Decree, 1979). 
By the early 1990s, after the Two Forks debate, the board 
changed its policies on many of these issues. Conservation 
savings are now used in the agency's hydrological models and 
its Citizens Advisory Council plays a more active role in 
policymaking activities. Still, the water commissioners made 
these changes when they decided that operational adjustments 
were needed, not when elected officials or other agencies told 
them that they had to be made. 
RESISTING PREDATION BY OTHER AGENCIES 
Resisting other agencies' predation was defined earlier as 
governmental managers' unwillingness to share or give up 
programmatic responsibilities to other governments. For the 
Denver Water Board, this would mean sharing responsibility 
for storing, treating, and delivering water to Denver's residents 
and for leasing unused water to the suburbs. Most attempts by 
other agencies to gain some influence over the board's decisions 
regarding its core tasks have been subtle. The Bureau of 
Reclamation cannot simply take over the Denver Water Board's 
responsibilities for water resources development, but it can 
propose projects with attractive financing provisions that would 
have the same effect. 
In 1948, for example, the Bureau of Reclamation issued a 
report entitled Blue-South Platte Project Colorado: A Potential 
Transmountain Diversion Project that proposed construction of a 
massive transbasin diversion for the front range. This project 
included a reservoir on the Blue River, a transbasin diversion 
tunnel, Two Forks Dam and Reservoir, and the conveyance 
facilities necessary to deliver the water to municipalities and 
farmers along the front range (U.S. Department of the Interior, 
Bureau of Reclamation, 1948). 
The bureau's offer would have been unresistable to most 
cities (Gottlieb, 1988; Reisner, 1986; Wiley and Gottlieb, 1982). 
Why not let the federal government subsidize Denver's 
municipal water supply? But the Denver Water Board opposed 
the federal plan, arguing that the Bureau of Reclamation had 
overestimated the supply available from the Blue River (Cassai, 
1955; "Blue-South Platte," 1956). Instead, the  water 
commissioners pursued a smaller project, the Blue River-Roberts 
Tunnel Diversion, that did not require the construction of Two 
Forks or an agricultural component. 
If the Denver Water Board had supported the bureau's 
project, its ability to perform its core tasks would have been 
undermined. Sharing capacity in a federal reservoir, with a 
variety of other claimants, does not carry the same control as 
owning the reservoir and making the rules. During times of 
drought, the suburbs and farmers would have begged the federal 
government for their fair share of the project's capacity. 
Additionally, many of the Denver Water Board's customers and 
other suburban governments have water rights on the western 
slope but do not have the fiscal capacity to build their own 
facilities. These governments would have surely pursued any 
opportunity to develop their water rights through a neutral 
agency, altering the region's water development dynamics.' 
The greatest threats come from the board's functional rivals 
in the Denver metropolitan area. As described earlier, elected 
officials from these governments have long sought water 
independence and have even worked with Denver officials on 
plans that would give them some control over the Denver Water 
Board's resources. Prior to the Foothills conflict, however, the 
water commissioners simply ignored these governments during 
their water development initiatives. But after the Foothills 
conflict, the water commissioncrs realized that suburban 
opposition to its projects, in conjunction with new federal 
regulatory requirements, would present a formidable obstacle 
to their future water development plans. 
In a first step toward gaining suburban support for their 
next water development venture, Two Forks Dam and Reservoir, 
the water commissioners made a deal with their special district 
water distributors in 1982. In their Metropolitan Water 
Development Agreement, the water commissioners offered these 
governments a share in all future projects in exchange for their 
financial and political support (Board of Water Commissioners, 
1982). Following from this agreement, in 1984, the water 
commissioners signed the Platte and Colorado River Storage 
Projects Participation Agreement: 
Whereas, the Board, having carefully considered all 
relevant factors affecting its ability to discharge its 
obligations under the charter of the city and county of 
Denver to provide adequate water supplies both for the 
present and in the future for use inside the City and 
County of Denver as well as its contractual obligations 
for the provision of present and future incremental needs 
of presently existing distributors of water from the Denver 
Municipal Water Works System, has found, determined 
and declared, in the exercise of its sole discretion, that 
80% of the [Two Forks] yield will not be required to 
discharge those charter and contract obligations.. .(Board 
of Water Commissioners, 1984, p. 5). 
Thus, since the Denver Water Board needed 20 percent of 
the project's capacity to adequately perform its core tasks, it 
offered the remaining 80 percent to its distributors. The deal 
did, however, have several catches. First, in exchange for 80 
percent of the project, the distributors had to pay 80 percent of 
the costs, including up-front costs for the permit process. Second, 
the commissioners asserted they maintain control over any 
facilities constructed under the agreement since their use and 
value were still dependent on the water department's pre- 
existing facilities. Finally, the board would also maintain control 
of the permit and construction processes (Board of Water 
Commissioners, 1984). 
After the board signed this agreement with its water 
distributors, it announced that the coalition would not 
immediately seek the permits needed to build Two Forks. 
Instead, it offered to conduct a system-wide environmental 
impact analysis to assess the metropolitan area's water needs 
and explore alternatives to development.' This study was 
strongly supported by the various stakeholders in the process, 
including the environmental interest groups and many of the 
suburban general purpose governments. While some of the 
suburban general purpose governments remained quite hostile 
to the Denver Water Board, the new spirit of intergovernmental 
cooperation that the impact analysis represented encouraged 
many members of Mayor Pefia's Metropolitan Cooperation 
Group to believe that regional government reform was possible 
(Davis, 1989; Russell, 1987). 
However, promises of government reform and the conduct 
of the system-wide environmental impact analysis were proving 
disastrous for the special districts that signed the Metropolitan 
Water Development Agreement. Because the Metropolitan 
Cooperation Group's discussions focused on the reform of 
metropolitan governance, the special district water distributors 
were excluded from the proceedings. Thus, just when the 
distributors were on the verge of building Two Forks, their own 
water storage facility, the general purpose governments were 
involved in discussions that might either dash their hopes of 
becoming self-sufficient or abolish them altogether. Moreover, 
as the costs of the impact study increased, the distributors were 
reminded that they were contractually obligated to pay 80 
percent of the bill, which had grown to well over $30 million 
dollars by 1986. 
Relief for the special district distributors finally came when 
the Denver Water Board announced that it would formally apply 
for the permits needed to build Two Forks in late 1986. The 
board's announcement brought a barrage of attacks from federal 
agencies, suburban governments, and environmental interest 
groups. Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service and the Environmental Protection Agency, contended 
that a mitigation plan to offset the project'senvironmental damage 
could not be developed. Suburban governments became especially 
riled as members of the Metropolitan Cooperation Group began 
to seek new water development alliances. The environmentalists, 
lead by the Environmental Defense Fund, Trout Unlimited, and 
the National Audubon Society, were able to successfully 
undermine public support for the project by revealing the board's 
previously unchallenged technical assumptions. Despite these 
challenges, by 1989 the Corps of Engineers announced that it 
would grant the water board the permits needed to construct 
Two Forks. But in 1990, after the water commissioners had spent 
more than $40 million dollars to produce the nation's most costly 
environmental impact statement, the Environmental Protection 
Agency began to take the necessary steps to veto the Corps' 
permits (Ellison, 1993; Leucke, 1990; U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1990). 
By signing the Metropolitan Water Development Agreement, 
the water commissioners seemed to change their policy with 
regard to shared programmatic responsibilities. But to the 
water commissioners, this agreement represented a political 
move designed to promote the construction of Two Forks* 
Based on more than 70 interviews conducted with members of 
the Denver metropolitan water community, it is clear that the 
board's intention was to undermine potential suburban 
opposition to the project while presenting the appearance of a 
unified front to the federal government. After all, the special 
district water distributors are suburban governments which 
made the Denver Water Board's application to the Corps of 
Engineers for a permit to build Two Forks seem like a request 
from dozens of thirsty governments not just one (Ellison, 1993). 
The board's true willingness to share programmatic 
responsibilities was revealed shortly after the Two Forks veto 
when it announced a variety of new programs and policies 
intended to force the suburbs to bear the burdens of water 
shortages. This action infuriated the special district water 
distributors, who claimed that the Denver Water Board 
demonstrated a "Jekyll and Hyde" attitude "expecting and 
getting cooperation when it needs help on issues ... but then 
refusing to extend the same spirit of cooperation to water 
policy" (Massaro, 1989, p. 8). 
The board's distributors hoped that their partnership was 
perpetual, but it was not. Although the water commissioners 
deny that they are trying to back out of the agreement, they are 
also quick to point out that several factors have changed their 
original terms. Under a new umbrella organization, the 
Metropolitan Denver Water Authority, the special districts 
filed suit against the water commissioners. The water 
commissioners have refused to support a lawsuit that could 
reverse the Environmental Protection Agency's decision. 
Moreover, the board already started development on other 
projects that were originally identified in the 1982 agreement as 
potential joint projects. The board's plan to expand its Williams 
Fork Collection System without the assistance of their special 
districts is a clear indication that the agency is no longer 
working under the provisions of the agreement (Ellison, 1993). 
Thus, to the critical analyst, i t  seems that the water 
commissioners simply used its special district distributors to 
pay the bill for their most costly water development venture. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article seeks to demonstrate that government managers 
exhibit competitive behavior in the quest for organizational 
autonomy, and that challenges to core tasks can come from 
similar agencies in other governments. This study also offered 
a. 
a strategy for assessing autonomy in action based on three overt 
behaviors: avoiding control by elected officials, avoiding 
unwanted functions, and resisting predation by other agencies. 
The results of this study indicate that the water commissioners 
have rarely strayed from their core tasks. 
The primary mechanism the water commissioners use to 
avoid control by elected officials is their employment of legal, 
technical, and fiscal expertise to keep the public's at tention 
focused on the agency's core tasks. Thus, as local elected 
officials from a variety of governments have challenged the 
Denver's water development plans, the water commissioners 
have always responded with technical language about the 
operation of the water utility rather than by addressing concerns 
about growth or economic development. 
Next, the water commissioners have also avoided unwanted 
functions, especially those that are in conflict with their core 
tasks. Conservation programming, for example, seemed like 
social regulation to the water commissioners. While they did 
develop and implement conservation programs, they were kept 
strictly separated from the agency's planning and water 
resources development functions. Finally, the Denver Water 
Board has resisted predation by refusing to share programmatic 
responsibilities with other agencies. The water commissioners 
did offer to share programmatic responsibilities with its special 
district distributors under the Metropolitan Water Development 
Agreement, but the bottom line is that these governments were 
not even given a say in how the board spent more than $32 
million dollars of their money during the Two Forks permit 
process. 
ENDNOTES 
'Charter of the City and County of Denver (ch. C, art. IV, sections 
C4.14 - 4.35). 
*A list of the persons interviewed (including the dates, times, and 
places) can be obtained by writing the author at SMSU-Master of 
Public Administration Program, 901 S. National Ave., Springfield, 
Missouri 65804 (e-mail: bae041 f@vma.smsu.edu). 
T h e  water commissioners can live with federal water projects in 
Denver as long as they do not interfere with the agency's ability to 
perform its critical task. The Army Corps of Engineers, for example, 
operates two facilities in the metropolitan area that were constructed 
to provide flood control benefits, Cherry Creek Reservoir and Chatfield 
Reservoir. DWB even stores water in Chatfield Reservoir in order to 
help the Corps maintain instream flows on the South Platte River and 
Cherry Creek (Board of Water Commissioners, 1991). 
'Central Records, Denver Water Board Minutes, 10 January 1984; 
17 April 1984. 
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